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IN SEARCH OF THE LOST CHORD: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE 1996 
ITEM VETO ACT 
Neal E. Devinst 
For more than one hundred years, Presidents have clamored 
for item veto authority. Contending-as Ronald Reagan did in his 
1986 State of the Union-that "I'll take the responsibility, I'll 
make the cuts, [and] I'll take the heat," Presidents have repeatedly 
challenged Congress to "give [them] the authority to veto waste."' 
Thanks to the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, Bill Clinton 
reaped an apparent windfall from the Contract with America, name-
ly, the power to cancel (subject to congressional override) any 
dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new 
direct spending, and certain limited tax benefits.Z 
On January 2, 1997, one day after the self-described "Line 
Item Veto Act" became effective,3 a potent bipartisan coalition of 
lawmakers and former executive and legislative branch officials 
t Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. This 
essay is an outgrowth of comments made at the Symposium entitled Presidential Power in 
the Twenty-First Century, Case Western Reserve School of Law (Apr. 4-5, 1997). Thanks 
to program participants, especially Mike Fitts, Lou Fisher, and Larry Lessig, for sharing 
their insights with me. Thanks also to Ken Greenspan for excellent research assistance. 
I. 22 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 135, 136 (1986). 
2. See Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996). 
The constitutionality of this legislation is now before the Supreme Court. See Joan 
Biskupic, Justices Put Line-Item Veto on Fast Track for Review, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 
1997, at A23. The focus of this essay, however, is the likely operation of item veto 
reforms. Since such reforms can be achieved through a constitutional amendment or better 
crafted legislation, a decision striking down the 1996 Act will not kill the item veto. As 
such, irrespective of what the Supreme Court says about the 1996 Act, the workability of 
the item veto will remain an important policy question. 
3. Despite its title, the Item Veto Act does not grant the President item veto authori-
ty. The President, rather than veto "items" in a bill of joint resolution, must sign or veto 
the entire measure. After signing a bill or joint resolution, the President may exercise his 
power-specified cancellation authority. 
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asked a court to strike the measure down because it "alter[s] the 
constitutional balance of powers between the Legislative and Exec-
utive Branches."4 Supporters of the Act, while conceding that the 
Congress is "taking action against [its institutional] interests,''5 
describe this shift in budgetary power as salutary. In particular, as 
bill sponsor John McCain (R-Ariz.) put it: "Given Congress' predi-
lection for ... [veto-proof] omnibus spending bills, and continuing 
resolutions, it would seem only prudent and constitutional to pro-
vide the President with functional veto power."& In other words, 
contrary to opponents' claims, "The Congress is not transferring 
power;" instead, "this bill does nothing more than" restore the 
President's veto power.7 
Conflicting characterizations of the item veto bill do share a 
common ingredient, namely, that the act is momentous. For sup-
porters, the bill promises to cut deficits and cures an imbalance of 
power between Congress and the White House; for opponents, the 
bill creates an imbalance of power. While legal challenges to the 
Act may well then turn on the courts' assessment of these compet-
ing spins,8 the Act's impact on both the budget and the balance of 
powers may be far less consequential than either supporters or 
opponents let on. Political will and socio-political context, rather 
than changes in the structural division of power, will likely prove 
dominant in defming the balance of power between the Congress 
and White House on budgetary policy.9 This was true before the 
4. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 5, Byrd v. Raines, Civil No. 97-000l(TPJ) 
(D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1997). The lawmakers include Robert Byrd, Mark Hatfield, and Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan. The government officials (who are the attorneys for these lawmakers) 
include former Clinton White House Council Lloyd Cutter, one time Senate Legal Council 
Mike Davidson, and ex-Reagan Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper. 
5. 142 CONG. REC. S2929, S2962 (1996) (remarks of Sen. Lott). 
6. 141 CONG. REc. S53, S104 (1995). 
7. ld. Some supporters, however, see the item veto as a broad delegation of legisla-
tive power to the president. As majority leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) put it "This is a 
fundamental change; there is no denying it." 142 CONG. REc. at S2962. For these sup-
porters, the item veto restores fiscal discipline to the appropriations process by "allowing 
the President to exercise leadership in controlling spending and to impose priorities." Id. 
at S2960 (remarks of Sen. Gramm). 
8. U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's April 10, 1997 decision striking 
down the Line Item Veto Act concluded that Congress impermissibly "ceded basic legisla-
tive authority" by transferring to the President "the function of repealing a provision of 
statutory law." Byrd v. Raines, Civil No. 97-0001(TPL), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4397, at 
*34 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1997). In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court expressed no 
opinion on the Act's constitutionality. Instead, the Court ruled that congressional plaintiffs 
lacked standing. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 1997 U.S. Lexis 4040 (1997). 
9. For a concise thoughtful explanation of why structural divisions of power do not 
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Line Item Veto Act was approved and will likely remain true. Put 
another way: Circumstances where the President is likely to make 
moderate use of the item veto are situations where the President 
would have successfully negotiated a budget compromise with 
Congress; circumstances where the President is likely to make 
aggressive use of the item veto are instances where the President 
would have used his veto and other powers to navigate a budget 
stalemate with Congress. 
Along these lines, the very fact that Congress approved the 
item veto suggests that Congress may well see this deficit cutting 
mechanism as being more about symbolic politics than about a 
fundamental shift in the balance of powers. For more than a de-
cade, Congress has been looking for ways to appear responsive to 
skyrocketing budget deficits without abandoning its taste for pork. 
The item veto is a curious but sensible solution to this dilemma. 
Indeed, irrespective of the Supreme Court's ultimate assessment of 
the Line Item Veto Act's constitutionality, 10 the line item veto 
may well become a permanent fixture of budgetary policymaking. 
While the Supreme Court can compel Congress to pursue budget-
ary reform through alternative means (including a constitutional 
amendment), no Supreme Court decision can damper those political 
forces that prompted Congress to approve the Line Item Veto Act. 
Why is Congress committed to item veto legislation? After all, 
the item veto allows the President to kill constituency-driven pork 
barrel appropriations. In reality, however, the President will be 
constrained in his exercise of the item veto for the very reason that 
Congress cannot resist deficit spending, namely, interest groups and 
voters alike want to protect, not eliminate, government largesse. No 
doubt, the President will make use of the item veto, especially on 
silly sounding projects that lack a politically potent constituency 
(endive farming, the Lawrence Welk museum, private schools in 
define the ultimate division of power among the branches, see Michael A. Fitts, The 
Foibles of Formalism: Applying a Political "Transaction Cost" Analysis to Separation of 
Powers, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1643 (1997). 
10. Raines v. Byrd, while not commenting on the Act's constitutionality, suggested that 
the Court would eventually decide this question. By referring to its "natural urge to pro-
ceed directly to the merits of this important dispute" and making clear that its decision 
does not foreclose "constitutional challenge (by someone who suffers judicially cognizable 
injury ... )," the Court indicated that Raines will not be its last word on the Item Veto 
Act Raines, 1997 Lexis at *33, *17. Instead, once the President exercises his item veto 
power, an individual adversely affected by the President's action undoubtedly will have 
standing to file suit At that time, the Item Veto Act is likely to again make its way 
onto the Supreme Court's docket 
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foreign countries, etc.). More significantly, the item veto will some-
times be used to place the President's priorities ahead of 
Congress'. Yet Congress has enough weapons in its arsenal to rein 
in an overly aggressive White House. For example, Congress can 
make use of many of the devices that state lawmakers now use to 
blunt governors' item veto power. Moreover, by shifting responsi-
bility to the President, Congress can approve constituency-driven 
programs without having to take the heat for adding to the nation's 
deficit. As a result, rather than make some hard budgetary deci-
sions, Congress can take cover behind its White House delegee. 
In the end, the item veto is likely to add more nuance than 
substance to the elaborate stew of Congressional-White House pow-
er sharing. For the most part, the President's exercise of this au-
thority will reflect the give and take between the branches that 
would have existed with or without the item veto. In this way, the 
item veto can be analogized to Japanese Kabuke theater:-"[A] 
highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence 
of something which in real life takes place in other venues."11 
This essay, while downplaying the item veto's likely signifi-
cance, will not embrace the item veto. My contention, instead, is 
that Congress and the White House would much prefer to operate 
within existing parameters than to dramatically restructure the bal-
ance of powers in the name of budget reform. 12 Part I will serve 
as a short course in President-Congress budgetary politics. This 
discussion will reveal that the item veto, rather than restore presi-
dential power, expands the President's power of the purse. Part II, 
however, will cast doubt on the practical significance of this new 
power. Not only is the item veto unlikely to result in substantial (if 
any) deficit reduction, it is not likely to significantly alter the 
balance of power between Congress and the White House.13 In 
addition to considering the likely operation of the item veto, this 
discussion will also consider the dynamic between the Executive 
and Congress on post-Chadha legislative vetoes and congressional 
information access requests. Part III will serve as a synthesis of 
11. E. Donald Elliot. Reinventing Rulemaldng, 41 DUKE LJ. 1490, 1492 (1992). 
12. For an explication of why Congress and the White House almost always operate 
within existing parameters, see Theodore J. Lowi, President v. Congress: What the Two-
Party Duopoly Has Done to the American Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. REs. L. 
REV. 1219 (1997). 
13. This conclusion is somewhat inconsistent with earlier writings of mine and testimo-
ny that I have presented to Congress. Those writings argue that the item veto, while 
resulting in little or no deficit reduction, will significantly shift the balance of power. 
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sorts. It will summarize the teachings, such as they are, of the first 
two parts as well as consider why Congress and White House 
resistance to a balanced budget amendment strengthens my central 
claim about elected government's disinterest in transforming itself 
in order to balance the budget. 14 
I. THE BUDGET AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS 
The Line Item Veto Act is, at least for now, the culminating 
event in a twenty-five year struggle between the White House and 
Congress. On one side of the divide, the Act is deemed a neces-
sary response to Congress's vitiation of the President's veto and, 
with it, the framers' belief that power should be shared among the 
three branches in order to limit the intrusiveness of the Federal 
Government. 15 On the other side, the Act is deemed a sell out of 
Congress' power of the purse in favor of a return to the heretofore 
discredited Nixon administration campaign to advance presidential 
policy priorities through the impoundment of appropriated funds. 
While it is tempting to say the truth lies somewhere between these 
poles, it does not. The Item Veto Act embraces a vision of the 
separation of powers at odds with the constitutional design.16 
A. The Rise and Partial Decline of Congress' 
Power of the Purse11 
The power of the purse lies with Congress. The Constitution 
prohibits money "drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
14. Lany Lessig makes a similar argument in his provocative, often compelling contri-
bution to this symposium. See Lawrence Lessig, Lessons From a Line Item Veto Law, 47 
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1659 (1997). Unlike Lany Lessig, however, I do not think that a 
combined Balanced Budget/Item Veto Amendment will necessarily accomplish much. Un-
less and until elected government is willing to treat the national debt as a flrst order 
priority, existing incentives to maintain expenditures without reducing taxes will remain. 
For this reason, Balanced Budget Amendment proposals are typically filled with loopholes. 
Beyond those built in escape hatches, as Mike Fitts ably demonstrates, structure, and with 
it structural refonn, is overestimated. See Fitts, supra note 9. 
15. Greg Sidak makes an analogous argument in support of the president's inherent 
item veto power. See Line Item Veto: The President's Constitutional Authority, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1074, 1088 (1993) (statement of J. Gregory Sidak). 
16. In saying that the item veto is inconsistent with the constitutional balance of pow-
ers, I do not mean that the Act is unconstitutional. 
17. Significant portions of the following section are borrowed from my prior work. See 
Neal Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 993, 
998-1004 (1990); Neal Devins, A Symbolic Balanced Budget Amendment, 9 J. LAW & 
POL. 61, 64-72 (1992). 
1610 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1605 
Appropriations made by Law."18 This power was placed outside of 
the executive, for fear of the consequences of centralizing the 
powers of purse and sword. As James Madison wrote in The Fed-
eralis.t No. 58: "This power of the purse may, in fact, be regarded 
as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any consti-
tution can arm the immediate representatives of the people."19 As 
characterized in the Senate's Iran-Contra Report: The appropriations 
power is "the Constitution's most significant check on Executive 
power."20 
The framers' conclusion that the "legislative department alone 
has access to the pockets of the people"21 does not mean that the 
President is proscribed from playing a role in legislative decision 
making on appropriations. Rather, the Constitution guarantees the 
President a large role in legislative decision making, including 
decision making on appropriations. In the f'rrst place, the President 
may recommend to Congress measures that he considers "necessary 
and expedient.'' More importantly, the President possesses a quali-
fied veto over legislation that allows him to force Congress to pay 
heed to his view of what is unnecessary or inexpedient. The fram-
ers regarded these separately enumerated powers as mutually sup-
porting an ongoing legislative role for the President. 
Nonetheless, the President's budgetary role is clearly subordi-
nate to that of Congress. Congress determines funding levels and 
establishes parameters for the expenditure of appropriated funds. 
Although the power to recommend, and especially the power to 
veto, enables the President to communicate vigorously his views to 
Congress and to participate actively in the process, Congress makes 
the ultimate decision whether and to what extent executive senti-
ments should prevail. 
Through its control of budgetary decision making, Congress is 
also empowered to create formal mechanisms of communication 
between the executive and the legislature on budgetary matters. 
Prior to 1921, the President had no statutory responsibilities for 
submitting a budget.22 The President's formal role began with the 
18. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
19. 1tiE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 300 (James Madison) (M. Beloff ed., 1987). 
20. SENATE SELEcr COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND NICARA· 
GUAN 0PPOSmON & HOUSE SELEcr COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSAC-
TIONS WITH IRAN, REPORT, S. REP. No. 216, H.R. REP. No. 433, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 
18 (1987). 
21. 1tiE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 254 (James Madison) (M. Beloff ed., 1987). 
22. See Loms FISHER, PREsiDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 9-35 (1975) (discussing presi-
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Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 ("l921 Act"),23 which Con-
gress enacted in response to the huge national debt accumulated 
during World War I. The 1921 Act required the President to con-
struct and submit an annual budget, but allowed Congress complete 
freedom to alter the budget. Congress was expected to coordinate 
its revenue and spending decisions with the President's budgetary 
recommendations. The President was supposed to be responsible for 
overall budget aggregates, with Congress retaining the right to set 
priorities within those aggregates. 
Although the 1921 Act accorded greater budgetary responsibil-
ity to the President, it did not alter the fundamental balance of 
power between Congress and the President.24 The President's re-
sponsibility to establish budget aggregates was more than tempered 
by Congress' power to increase or decrease the President's budget 
by a simple majority vote. The 1921 Act thus respected two essen-
tial constitutional principles: the President's responsibility for his 
own proposals and Congress' ultimate responsibility for appropria-
tions, subject only to the President's veto. Under the 1921 Act, 
Congress did not surrender or dilute its fiscal prerogatives, nor 
invade any executive prerogatives. In fact, the 1921 Act did not 
subordinate either branch to the other but carefully preserved their 
respective roles. 
Congress sought again to protect its budgetary prerogatives 
and preserve the balance of power between the executive and itself 
when it enacted the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Con-
trol Act of 1974.25 Congress passed the Budget Act in response to 
the impoundment controversy of the early 1970s in which President 
Nixon claimed that the executive could refuse to spend appropriat-
ed funds if he judged such refusal to be in the national interest. 
Presidential impoundments threatened the budgetary balance of 
dential duties in budget matters prior to the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act). 
23. Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921). 
24. As stated in the House Report: 
It will doubtless be claimed by some that this is an Executive budget and that 
the duty of making appropriations is a legislative rather than Executive preroga-
tive. The plan outlined does provide for an Executive initiation of the budget, 
but the President's responsibility ends when he has prepared the budget and 
transmitted it to Congress. 
H. R. REP. No. 14, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1921). 
25. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat 297 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of I, 2 & 31 U.S.C.). 
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power. By withholding appropriations, the President could control 
aggregates and priorities. 
The Budget Act contained a number of provisions designed to 
strengthen congressional control over fiscal affairs. Under the Bud-
get Act, presidential rescissions of appropriated funds required both 
Senate and House approval.26 The Budget Act also created Budget 
Committees in the House and Senate,27 established a Congressio-
nal Budget Office to supply technical support,28 and required the 
adoption of budget resolutions to set overall limits on budget ag-
gregates (such as total outlays and revenues) and permit debate on 
spending priorities.29 In formulating its budget resolutions since 
197 4, Congress has often applied economic, technical and policy 
assumptions different from those presented in the executive bud-
get.3o 
The 1974 Act then enabled Congress to defend itself against 
the so-called "imperial presidency.'m In particular, the Nixon ad-
ministration had launched a concerted effort to extend White House 
authority through both governmental reorganization and claims of 
inherent presidential authority. Along with its claim of impound-
ment authority, for example, the Nixon White House centralized 
presidential control over the administrative state through its estab-
lishment, in 1970, of the Office of Management and Budget.32 
Fearing these and other initiatives, Congress fought back through 
the 1974 Budget Act, the War Powers Resolution, and its use of 
the legislative veto to · condition its delegations of policymaking 
authority.33 · 
26. See §§ 1012, 1017, 88 Stat. at 333-34, 337-39. The President could defer the 
spending of funds, subject to a one-house veto. See id. § 1013, 88 Stat at 334-35. The 
Supreme Court struck down one-house legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 
(1983). 
27. See §§ 101-102, 88 Stat at 299-302. 
28. See id. §§ 201-203, 88 Stat. at 302-05. 
29. See id. §§ 302, 305, 88 Stat. at 306-08, 310-12. Through the use of a congressio-
nal budget adopted in concurrent resolutions, Congress sets "macro" policy and allocates 
the outlays and budget authority among a number of broad categories, such as national 
defense, health, and agriculture. Congress is still supposed to fonnulate and fund specific 
programs through regular appropriation bills, but within the broad outlines of the budget 
resolution. See A. ScmCK, LEGISLATION, APPROPRIATIONS, AND BUDGETS: THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF SPENDING DECISION-MAKING IN CONGRESS 41-43 (Cong. Res. Serv. 1984). 
30. See A. SCHICK, R. KEITH & E. DAVID, MANUAL ON TilE FEDERAL BUDGET PRo-
CESS 5 (Cong. Res. Serv. 1984). 
31. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). 
32. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 46-58. 
33. For case study treatments of the legislative veto and War Powers Resolution, see 
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The 1974 Budget Act's recalibration of the balance of powers 
came at a price, however. Specifically, the principal consequence of 
this transformation was fiscal irresponsibility. The Budget Act 
hinged on a centralized process, the budget resolution. Yet Con-
gress, unlike the quintessentially centralized Executive, is strongly 
decentralized.34 Whereas the Office of Management and Budget 
("OMB") must answer to the President, and serves as the White 
House's authoritative voice on budget matters, the Congressional 
Budget Office ("CBO") has less institutional clout because it is not 
answerable to any of the 535 members for which it speaks. These 
institutional differences have contributed to the budget deficit in 
two quite distinct ways. First, by devaluing the President's budget-
ary role, Congress and the White House both pay more attention to 
program priorities than budget aggregates. Consequently, anticipated 
revenues have been overestimated in order to make way for greater 
spending. Congress accomplished this mischief by voting a gener-
ous ceiling in the budget resolution, while the President simply 
manipulated his aggregates to accommodate policy preferences.35 
Second, by centralizing its budgetary decision making through both 
the budget resolution and increased reliance on omnibus appropria-
tions housed in a single continuing resolution (rather than thirteen 
separate appropriations bills), Congress became vulnerable to cen-
tralized but ill-conceived budget planning.36 
Witness the exponential growth of budget deficits since 1981. 
Prior to 1981, the accumulated national debt stood at roughly one 
trillion dollars. Although over-optimistic budget projections made 
deficits common (occurring in all but five years since 1950), deficit 
spending averaged only 5.1 percent of total outlays from 1950-
1980.37 That all changed in 1981. Riding the wake of Ronald 
LoUIS FISHER AND NEAL DEVINS, POUTICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120-
134, 151-172 (2d ed. 1996). 
34. An explication of how Congress' decentralized structure creates collective action 
problems that adversely affect fiscal policymaking can be found in Michael Fitts & Robert 
Inman, Controlling Congress: Presidential Influence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEO. 
LJ. 1737 (1992). 
35. See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLmCS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE EXECU-
TIVE 192 (3d ed. 1993). 
36. See Rudolph Penner, An Appraisal of the Congressional Budget Process, in THE 
BUDGET PROCESS: EXERCISING POLmCAL CHOICE 67 (Allen Schick ed., 1986); Allen 
Schick, How The Budget Was Won and Lost, in PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: ASSESSING 
REAGAN'S FIRST YEAR 26-27 (Nonnan Ornstein ed., 1985). 
37. See Paul Peterson, The New Politics of Deficits, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMER-
ICAN PoLmcs 367 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985). 
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Reagan's dramatic 1980 election victory, the Reagan administration 
successfully pushed through Congress a new vision of economic 
growth-supply side economics. Believing that a tax cut would 
spur more than enough economic growth to offset lost revenues, 
Congress slashed taxes by an estimated $150 billion annually, 
while reducing expenditures by less than $50 billion.38 Things did 
not work out as planned. Supply side economics could not tum 
around restrictive Federal Reserve Board action and a sluggish 
economy.39 As a result, the Reagan administration deficit estimate 
was off by over $100 billion.40 
The 1981 deficit debacle reveals the failings of the 197 4 Act 
structure. With neither branch taking the heat for unrealistic budget 
aggregates, the likelihood of widely supported social policy objec-
tives (such as increasing programmatic expenditures or decreasing 
taxes) controlling aggregate figures was greatly increased.41 Fur-
thermore, the unrealistic economic assumptions utilized in 1981 set 
in motion subsequent deficits. By 1985, budget deficits were so 
outrageous that Congress felt compelled to act. Its solution was the 
peculiar Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act. Gramm-
Rudman represents something of a hybrid. In enacting the bill, 
Congress proved it was no longer willing to trust either its own 
internal budgetary process or the President's.42 Consequently, an 
automatic sequestration procedure ensures that the budget conforms 
to deficit reduction targets. Specifically, if the regular appropria-
tions process does not produce a budget within Gramm-Rudman's 
prescribed deficit reduction target,43 the OMB prepares a seques-
tration order to be issued shortly after the start of the fiscal 
38. See id. at 382 (citing 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 93,259 (1981)). 
39. See id. at 382-84. 
40. See id. at 384-85. 
41. Indeed, while 1981 was a watershed, a comparison of the five years before and 
the five years after the 1974 Act reveals that the annual deficit had already quadrupled. 
See JOHN CRAWFORD, BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT SUDDENLY COMES TO LIFE, re· 
printed in 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPr. 1234-35 (1992) (National Taxpayers Union Chart). 
See also Louis Fisher, Federal Budget Doldrums: The Vacuum in Presidential Leadership, 
50 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 693, 697 (1990). 
42. See Jack Brooks, Gramm-Rudman: Can Congress and the President Pass This 
Buck?, 64 TEx. L. REv. 131, 131 (1985) (labeling Gramm-Rudman "a wholesale abdica-
tion of constitutional responsibility"). 
43. Under Gramm-Rudman, the calculation of the maximum expenditure level within 
the deficit reduction target is made by the OMB. See The Balanced Budget and Emergen-
cy Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
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year.44 In order to limit executive control, Congress specified 
mandatory formulae for allocating the spending cuts.45 The execu-
tive, therefore, could not use the sequestration order as an opportu-
nity to control budget priorities. As Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex) 
explained: 
Let me make note of . . . why this is significantly different 
than impoundment, and why it is significantly different 
than any line-item veto approach. We all know that the 
difficulties in those procedures is that Members of Con-
gress are jealous of their powers, and they do not want to 
transfer power to the executive branch. . . . This bill does 
not create new powers.46 
Although Gramm-Rudman did not alter the fundamental bud-
getary balance of power, Congress' utilization of automatic mecha-
nisms and reliance on entities outside its control paved the way for 
the further abdication of budgetary responsibility. As former Con-
gressman Jack Brooks (D-Tex) wrote in his lament of Gramm-
Rudman: "Active efforts to cure a problem may be controversial 
and are seldom risk-free. It is tempting to believe that avoiding 
blame is a safer course."47 He added, "Gramm-Rudman demon-
strates once again that political accountability is an extremely diffi-
cult problem for the American system of government."48 
Gramm-Rudman, in fact, exacerbated the failings of the 1974 
Act. Rather than compelling realism, the Act spawned budget gim-
mickry. As former CBO head Rudolph Penner noted: "Gramm-
Rudman produced forecasts that promised to achieve deficit goals 
when there was little hope of coming close to them. It promoted 
dishonest accounting that seemed to make the deficit lower than it 
really was."49 Gramm-Rudman also contributed to the rise of om-
44. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-119, § 102(b)(l), 101 Stat. 754, 767 (1987) (codified as amended at 2 
u.s.c. § 902(b)(l) (1989)). 
45. For a description of this process, see Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: 
The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 16 CAL. L. REv. 593, 630-33 (1988). 
46. 131 CONG. REc. 25,840 (1985) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm). 
47. Brooks, supra note 42, at 135. 
48. /d. at 137. 
49. Rudolph Penner, No Will, No Way, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at A23. Examples 
of this include shifting costs away from the present year to an earlier year and raising 
revenue in the current year at the expense of future revenue. See id. Another tactic was 
for the OMB to limit program cuts by grossly overestimating revenues. See Jackie 
Calmes, Despite Tough Talk, Big Cuts Unlikely, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPT. 218, 218-19 
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nibus spending bills housed in continuing resolutions. Appropria-
tions subcommittees, fearing that their budgets would be cut a 
second time to make up for those subcommittees that failed to 
meet their deficit-reduction goals, refused to bring their bills for-
ward.50 As a result, Gramm-Rudman created disincentives for the 
making of hard budgetary choices. Moreover, by encouraging last 
minute action, Gramm-Rudman shifted control away from decen-
tralized appropriation subcommittees to the more centralized Appro-
priations Committee, which hammered out the entire budget in the 
form of a continuing resolution. 
Unrealistic budget projections and centralized budgeting are the 
hallmarks of Gramm-Rudman. This outcome should come as no 
surprise. From 1986-1991 (when deficit targets were in place), the 
nation's deficit rose $1.2 trillion.51 During this period, the actual 
deficit exceeded deficit reduction targets by more than $400 bil-
lion.52 
Gramm-Rudman is revealing for other reasons. Notwithstanding 
the high political stakes of reining in a runaway deficit, Congress' 
crafting of the original Gramm-Rudman statute seemed, at best, 
haphazard. The Senate held no hearings and House hearings were 
little more than a formality, with only four persons invited to testi-
fy.53 Moreover, rather than seriously consider warnings that the 
Act was unconstitutional, Congress included within the statute a 
procedure that would guarantee expedited review by the Supreme 
Court.54 This pass-the-buck mentality underscores the source of 
much of our deficit woes-Congress' unwillingness to hold itself 
accountable for the responsible exercise of its "power of the 
purse."55 
(1990). Former Senate Budget Committee Chair Jim Sasser (D-Tenn), expressing frustra-
tion at this subterfuge, complained that "we have ended up with two sets of books. • . . 
First, we keep a set for the Gramm-Rudman game-and this is a useful fiction manipulat-
ed to give the illusion of progress-and second, we keep a set of books that are the real 
books. This is the real deficit." Budget Reform Proposals, Joint Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Governmental Affairs and the Senate Comm. on the Budget, lOlst Cong., 
1st Sess. 2 (1989). 
50. Congressman David Obey, then an appropriations subcommittee chair, castigated the 
Gramm-Rudman model for creating "an incentive for every committee around here not to 
bring their bill out to floor." 134 CONG. REc. H66, H69 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1988). 
51. See ROBERT KEITH & EDWARD DAVIS, CONG. REsEARCH SERVICE, A BALANCED 
FEDERAL BUDGET: MAJOR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3 (1992). 
52. See id. 
53. See FlSHER & DEVINS, supra note 33, at 135. 
54. See id. at 135-36. 
55. In particular, rather than bear the decisional costs for tough budgetary choices, 
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The failure of Gramm-Rudman prompted further reforms in 
1990. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 substituted heretofore 
impossible-to-meet deficit-reduction goals with spending guide-
lines.56 These guidelines, by placing separate upper limits on de-
fense, domestic, and international spending, were intended to keep 
expenditures stable. The problem is that the deficit once again 
exploded. The combination of a costly savings and loan bailout and 
a persistent recession that limited revenues resulted in a deficit 
estimated at more than $350 billion for fiscal year 1992, the Act's 
first year in operation.57 By ignoring the problems of revenues 
altogether, the Budget Enforcement Agreement accomplished little 
other than to provide the cover of "a supposedly statutory man-
date., to the Congress and White House.58 
Fiscal year 1993 brought more of the same. Agreeing to an 
extension of the 1990 agreement, President Clinton and Congress 
congratulated each other for responding to the deficit crisis without 
making the hard choices necessary to eat into the ever-ballooning 
deficit. At the end of 1996, the public debt had grown an addition-
al $1 trillion and stood at $5.3 trillion dollars. This figure is truly 
frightening. When Ronald Reagan became President, the debt stood 
at $1 trillion. Since that time, it has grown at a rate of $1 trillion 
every four years ($3 trillion in 1989; $4 trillion in 1993; $5.3 
trillion in 1997).59 In other words, Congress and the White 
House's posturing as well as the enactment of several budget re-
form measures seem somewhat beside the point. Moreover, with 
annual interest on the national debt now standing at roughly $1 
trillion, there is reason to think that a dramatic restructuring of the 
current arrangement is in order. For that reason, the Item Veto Act 
is especially important. 
Unlike earlier reform efforts, the item veto bill appears to be a 
license to kill.60 Specifically, whenever the President signs an ap-
propriations bill, he may (within five calendar days after enact-
Congress sought to hide behind Gramm-Rudmann's mandator:y formulas. 
56. See George Hager, New Rules to Old Game, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPT. 336 
(1991). 
57. See George Hager, Is the Deficit Now Too Big for Congress to Tame?, 50 CONG. 
Q. WKLY. RPT. 1140 (1992). 
58. LoutS FISHER, CONSTITliTIONAL CONFLICfS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESI-
DENT 211 {4th ed. 1997). 
59. See id. 
60. Congress, however, can end run many of the bill's specifications. See infra notes 
106-12 and accompanying tex.L 
1618 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1605 
ment) cancel dollar amounts identified in the bill as well as any 
dollar amount revealed in any table, chart, or explanatory text 
contained in a committee report or statement of the appropriation 
bill's managers.61 Once the President exercises this cancellation 
authority, Congress has thirty days to pass a bill disapproving of 
the President's cancellations.62 Any "disapproval bill" Congress 
passes is then subject to constitutionally specified presidential veto 
and congressional override procedures.63 Hence, unless two-thirds 
of both houses of Congress disapprove of the President's actions, 
the President appears (legally) unrestrained in his ability to rescind 
discretionary appropriations. 
The Line Item Veto Act appears, in critical respects, to be a 
sea change in presidential spending power. No longer is the Presi-
dent dependent on Congress; instead, cancellations take effect 
whenever one-third (plus one) of either house of Congress sides 
with the President. Nevertheless, some Act supporters cast the item 
veto as little more than a "restor[ation] [of] the constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances."64 This characterization, as the next 
part will demonstrate, is incorrect. Rather than protect inherent 
presidential power from a Congress bent on "eliminating the 
President's veto authority,"65 cancellation authority is a truly new 
power that threatens to misalign the balance of powers.66 
B. The Veto Power 
Line item veto proponents argue that the item veto restores 
essential presidential power. This claim has two components. First, 
61. Presidential cancellation power also extends to entitlement authority, food stamps, 
and limited tax benefits. 
62. Congress may strike from the disapproval bill any canceled item that no longer 
commands majority support. 
63. In this way, the Act avoids Chadha-like bicameralism and presentment problems. 
Specifically, whenever Congress acts, legislation is approved by both Houses and present-
ed to the President for his signature or veto. In his opinion invalidating the Item Veto 
Act, however, Judge Jackson argued that, under Chadha, "there are formal aspects of the 
legislative process that Congress may not alter." 142 CONG. REc. S2929, S2999 (1996). 
For Jackson, the Act's broad delegation of legislative power is inconsistent with Chadha's 
command that legislative power resides with the Congress. For further discussion, see 
infra note 99 and accompanying text. 
64. 141 CoNG. REc. H1143 (1995) (comments of Rep. Cox). Other Act supporters see 
the item veto as a very broad delegation of power necessitated by Congress' fiscal irre-
sponsibility. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
65. 141 CONG. REc. H1143 (1995) (comments of Rep. Cox). 
66. For an explication of why such a misalignment is unlikely to happen, see infra 
notes 135-48 and accompanying text. 
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speaking of the 1974 Budget Act as a fundamental shift in power 
that "deprived the President" of his "right" to impound funds, Act 
supporters depict the item veto as little more than a return to the 
status quo ante.67 Second, contending that "[t]he modern congres-
sional practice of presenting the President with omnibus legislation 
reduces the President's ability to play the role in enacting laws that 
the Constitution intended," item veto authority has been heralded as 
a "practical and principled" way to resurrect the veto power.68 
Neither of these claims can withstand scrutiny. The veto power 
has always been limited to bills, not bill provisions. Along these 
lines, Nixon administration efforts to substitute impoundments for 
vetoes were an aggrandizement of presidential power, not the de-
fensive exercise of preexisting power. Claims that omnibus bills 
unconstitutionally aggrandize legislative power are also unpersua-
sive. The Constitution places no single subject limitations on Con-
gress. Moreover, the rise of omnibus legislation has not under-
mined the presidential veto. An energetic President, through the 
threatened use of his veto power, may take advantage of high 
stakes omnibus legislation to enhance his bargaining position.69 
Omnibus Legislation and the Constitution. Article I, Section 7 
simply provides that every bill "shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate" and shall be "presented to the 
President" before it becomes law.70 This process requirement nei-
ther limits the scope nor sweep of legislation. As such, it is pre-
posterous to suggest that omnibus legislation runs afoul of this 
requirement. In fact, "we have had omnibus bills from the start," 
including the frrst three appropriation bills passed by Congress.71 
The question remains whether the Constitution empowers the 
President with inherent item veto or impoundment authority to fend 
off Congress' bundling of disparate items into an omnibus bill. 
Although the Constitution does not explicitly repudiate such presi-
dential authority,72 nowhere in the Constitution can there be found 
67. 141 CoNG. REc. S4153 (1995) (statement of Sen. McCain). 
68. Statement of President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 4, 32 WKLY. COMP. 
PREs. Docs. 637 (1996). 
69. For a thoughtful treatment on what it means to be an energetic president, see 
TERRY EAsTLAND, ENERGY IN TIIE ExECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR A STRONG PRESIDENCY 
(1992). 
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2. 
71. Line Item Veto: Hearings on S. 43 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and Admin-
istration, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1985) (statement of Louis Fisher); see also Note, Is 
A Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE LJ. 838, 840-43 (1987). 
72. Greg Sidak and Thomas Smith make much of this fact in their quasi·defense of 
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inherent item veto or impoundment authority. In particular, inherent 
item veto and impoundment authority seem at odds with the 
Constitution's designation of Congress as the lawmaking branch of 
government. Since neither house of Congress can insist on its 
preferred version of legislation without the others' consent, inherent 
item veto or impoundment authority would effectively give the 
President more power in the legislative process than the Congress. 
Specifically, since it would require two-thirds of both houses of 
Congress to overtake either a line item veto or impoundment/3 
the President could adjust legislation to suit his preferences without 
the assent of Congress. In other words, inherent line item veto or 
impoundment authority makes a mockery of the Framers' decision 
to limit the President's legislative role vis-a-vis Congress by favor-
ing a qualified veto over an absolute veto.74 
Claims that the decision to spend or withhold appropriated 
funds are part and parcel of the President's duty to "faithfully 
execute" the law also fall short. This common sense conclusion, 
shared by "[v]irtually all commentators," is best expressed in a 
1988 Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") opinion.75 Observing that 
"to give the president the authority to impound funds in order to 
protect the national fisc, creates the anomalous result that the Presi-
dent would be declining to execute the laws under the claim of 
faithfully executing them,"76 the OLC rejected claims of inherent 
impoundment authority notwithstanding Reagan administration 
efforts to expand the President's role in budgetary policy.77 
inherent presidential item veto authority. See J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four 
Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. L. REv. 437 (1990). 
73. Item vetoes would be subject to Congress' traditional two-thirds override. Impound-
ments could only be nullified if Congress reenacts the appropriation and then overrides a 
near certain presidential veto. For further discussion of impoundment overrides, see supra 
notes 61-63 and accompanying text (describing Item Veto Act override procedures). 
74. See Michael Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. L. REV. 
735 (1993) (demonstrating that the Framers were aware of and rejected inherent item veto 
authority). 
75. See 12 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 159, 207 (Prelim. Print 1988). 
76. Id. at 207-208. 
77. Doug Kmiec, a former head of the OLC, took issue with this opinion's related 
conclusion that the President is without inherent item veto authority. Perceiving that the 
OLC should serve the President's political agenda through expansive interpretations of 
executive power, Kmiec criticized members of the OLC for trading off the President's 
interests for their personal interests in maintaining their reputation as neutral constitutional 
analysts. See Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
337, 353-59 (1993). 
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Omnibus Legislation and Veto Politics. "From the nature of the 
Constitution," as George Washington put it, Presidents "must ap-
prove all parts of a bill or reject it in toto."78 With that said, Item 
Veto Act supporters argue that Congress' practice of bundling 
disparate items into a single "bill," even if technically constitution-
al, distorts the balance of powers by making it too difficult for the 
President to exercise his veto.79 Accordingly, presidential item 
veto and impoundment authority are trumpeted as a "restor[ation] 
[of] what the founders saw as the strongest deterrent to wasteful 
spending by Congress, an energetic executive with the power to 
force a thoughtful and thorough debate on individual. items of 
spending."80 I fmd this argument shortsighted. Omnibus legislation 
has not proven the downfall of either the presidency or the veto 
power. 
President Reagan, for example, was well served by the 1981 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act. According to Louis Fisher, "The 
omnibus nature of the bill was championed by the White House 
and presidential supporters as the only way to make cuts in popu-
lar programs."81 Reagan-era omnibus continuing resolutions, more-
over, did not undermine the veto power. Although omnibus legisla-
tion changes the nature of the exchange between the White House 
and Congress, the veto still functions as a mediating device. For 
example, in 1982, President Reagan vetoed two orrmibus measures 
and weathered a shutdown of parts of the federal government. 82 
As a result, Congress was forced to rework these bills to satisfy 
presidential needs.83 More significantly, in 1987 the White House 
and Congress undertook extensive negotiations to ensure that a 
fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution was satisfactory· to both 
78. Quoted in CHARLES J. ZINN, THE VETO POWER OF THE PREsiDENT 22 (1951). 
79. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H1078, H1099 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Rohrabacher); 
id. at H1102 (remarks of Rep. Torkildnse); id. at H1143 (remarks of Rep. Fox). 
80. ld. at H1100 (remarks of Rep. Cox). Along these lines, an argument can be made 
that those "concerned with the task of preserving initial constitutional commitments in 
light of changes in the constitutional context" might support item veto authority. See 
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. I, 93 (1994). For reasons discussed in the balance of this section, however, I 
think that supporters of "translational" approaches to constitutional interpretation should 
reject claims of inherent item veto and impoundment authority. 
81. Louis Fisher, Continuing Resolutions: Can't Live With 'em, Can't Live Without 
'em, 48 PuB. BUDGEfiNG & FIN. 101, 103 (1988). 
82. William Chapman, Congress Leaves for Holiday With Money Tangle Unsolved, 
WASH. POST, July 2, 1982, at AI. 
83. See, e.g., Sandra Evans Teeley, GOP Floats $1 Billion Housing Plan, WASH. POST, 
July 22, 1982, at 01, col. 1. 
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sides. In the end, Congress abandoned the fairness doctrine and 
included Contra aid to stave off a threatened veto. 84 If anything, 
such legislative compromise reveal that a President who is willing 
to use his veto wields enormous power in such negotiations. The 
vitality of the veto power therefore cannot be measured by its 
exercise. Rather, the effectiveness of the veto power must be mea-
sured by its impact on the political process. The "all or nothing" 
stakes of omnibus legislation enabled President Reagan to enhance 
his veto power through its threatened exercise. 
As a matter of simple mathematics, frequency of use is also a 
poor measure of the veto power's impact. Prior to the present era 
of omnibus legislation, Presidents infrequently used their veto pow-
er.85 Washington vetoed only two bills. Seven Presidents never 
used the power. Two Presidents, Franklin Roosevelt and Grover 
Cleveland, account for roughly half of all vetoes. In short, although 
Presidents may underutilize the veto power, the advent of omnibus 
legislation is not the cause of its infrequent use. 
The vitality of the veto power is today and has always been a 
function of presidential energy. Witness, for example, George 
Bush's extraordinarily effective and aggressive use of the veto 
power. 86 On forty-three occasions, Bush vetoed public bills. More 
striking, a predominantly Democratic Congress was able to override 
only one of these vetoes. As a result, Bush won important conces-
sions from civil rights interests in the omnibus 1991 Civil Rights 
Act and preserved anti-abortion language in appropriations bills. 87 
Furthermore, Bill Clinton's willingness to veto several appropria-
tions bills and shut the government down rather than approve a 
84. See Jackie Calmes, Reagan Wins Concessions in Final Funding Bill, 45 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. REP. 3185, 3186 (1987). The President also used his veto threat to preserve funds 
for anti-abortion counseling and for foreign assistance. See id. 
85. See Calvin Bellamy, Item Veto: Shield Against Deficits or Weapon of Presidential 
Power?, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 557, 574-75 (1988). 
86. See Janet Hook, President's Mastery of Veto Perplexes Hill Democrats, 49 CONG. 
Q. WKLY. RPT. 2041 (1991). 
87. On the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under 
Bush, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 955, 982-999 (1993). On Bush's abortion vetoes, see 
NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 102-104 (1996). In addition to these 
vetoes, Bush also made effective use of veto threats. For example, he threatened to veto 
the fiscal year 1990 budget bill and consequently let the Gramm-Rudman sequestration 
take effect in order to further both his budget priorities and his bargaining position with 
Congress. See Jodie Allen, How the Administration is Beating Congress in the Budget 
Game, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1989, at B3. 
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significant tax cut enhanced his bargaining position with Congress 
as well as his reelection prospects. 88 
The Line Item Veto Act expands, rather than restores, essential 
presidential prerogatives in the budget process. Neither the rise of 
omnibus legislation nor the design of the Constitution supports 
presidential item veto or impoundment authority as a mechanism to 
preserve the President's role in the balance of powers. The veto 
power remains vital in this era of omnibus legislation. Its potency 
seems more a function of presidential energy than Congress' ma-
nipulation of the legislative process. Furthermore (and far more 
significant), outside of the power to veto legislation, the Constitu-
tion does not specify any budgetary role for the President. In fact, 
prior to 1921, the President had no formal budgetary responsibili-
ties. Starting with the Budget Act of 1921, Congress shared some 
of its budgetary power with the President. Yet, until its approval of 
the Line Item Veto Act, Congress never ceded its power to set 
budgetary priorities to the White House.89 For this reason, critics 
of the Act sound an apocalyptic warning. Depicting the measure as 
"a truly fundamental change to our system of government" which 
will "take the appropriation process out of . . . [Congress and] 
transport it down to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue," Act opponents 
warn, "This is the Constitution. This is not the so-called Contract 
with America. This is the Constitution. •.w Section IT will serve as 
a partial assessment of this claim. 
IT. POLffiCAL WILL AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS: 
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
LINE ITEM VETO ACT 
Changes in the structural division of power, while hardly irrele-
vant, are but one ingredient that defmes budgetary policy. Consider 
the Line Item Veto Act: Were structural divisions determinative, 
the Act would place presidential budget priorities ahead of 
88. See Dan Balz, Debates Offer Dole Opportunity to Reshape Struggling Campaign, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at AI. Clinton, however, did approve a modest tax cut and 
agreed to Republican imposed spending cuts on several federal programs. See Ann 
Devroy, Bill Signed to Fully Reopen Government, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1996, at AI. 
89. Congress, however, has occasionally granted the President substantial power to set 
budget priorities. In the late 1960s, for example, the President was allowed to adjust 
spending ceilings. See Lams FISHER, THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 106-110 (1971). 
90. 141 CONG. REc. S4313, S4315 (1995) (remarks of Sen. Lautenberg); 141 CONG. 
REc. Hl028, H1090 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Kajorski); 141 CONG. REc. S4222, S4227 
(1995) (remarks of Sen. Byrd). 
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Congress' and severely limit one of the most potent weapons in 
Congress' legislative arsenal. As such, Congress' approval of the 
item veto would seem bizarre, a self-inflicted wound on a grand 
scale. In some measure, congressional debates on the Item Veto 
Act embrace this "structure is everything" vision. Act opponents, 
not surprisingly, depicted Congress' vote on the measure as a mod-
em day Armageddon.91 What is surprising is that, in some mea-
sure, Act proponents agree with this characterization. Deeming the 
Act "a major, major change in the policy of the Congress toward 
the executive branch," some proponents claim that Congress must 
sever its own powers in order to extricate a cancer (Congress' 
fiscal irresponsibility) which "threatens to destroy the future well 
being of our great nation. "92 
The truth, however, is that the Line Item Veto Act is not near-
ly as epic as its defenders and critics suggest. Although the Act 
transfers legislative power to the President, Congress can easily 
blunt this power by specifying appropriations priorities through 
unofficial and informal documents, by bundling disparate programs 
into a single item, and by rmancing programs indirectly through 
nonappropriation bills.93 Congress, moreover, may rein in the Pres-
ident though its lawmaking, oversight, and confirmation powers. 
Furthermore, with much of the budget outside the reach of the 
Line Item Veto Act (either because the appropriation is mandatory 
or the spending program politically popular), the President will be 
constrained in his exercise of the item veto. 
None of this is to suggest that the item veto is a nullity.94 At 
the margins, it will enhance the President's position in budgetary 
91. See id. and accompanying text; see also 141 CONG. REc. S2929, S2980 (1996) 
(remarks of Sen. Reid) (describing the Act as being about "abrogating constitutional re-
sponsibility. It is about ceding unbridled spending authority to one individual in one 
branch of the government"); id. at S2985 (remarks of Sen. Johnston) ("Why this Con-
gress, this Senate would want to give up its constitutional powers • . . why we would 
want to do that, I do not know.''); id. at H3000 ("[O]ne day there will be a Ph. D. writ-
ing a thesis about . . . how we gave up our power, how we gave up the balance of 
powers that exists in our democracy.''). 
92. 142 CONG. REC. at S2955 (remarks of Sen. Stevens). Other proponents characterize 
the Act as a restoration of presidential power, not a delegation of legislative power. See 
supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text 
93. See LoUIS FISHER, STATE TECHNIQUES TO BLUNr THE GOVERNOR'S ITEM-VETO 
POWER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Dec. 12, 1996). 
94. It is to suggest, however, that claims that the Item Veto Act unconstitutionally 
disrupts the balance of powers are over-blown. Unless and until the President makes ag-
gressive partisan use of cancellation authority, courts should reject "balance of powers" 
challenges to the Act's constitutionality. 
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battles with Congress. In particular, Congress must have the politi-
cal will necessary to fend off presidential encroachments. Yet, just 
as an energetic President can make effective use of his veto power 
in this era of omnibus legislation,95 Congress too can retain its 
power of the purse. In the end, the reach of the item veto is as 
much a by-product of political will as it is of structural divisions 
of authority.96 The truth of this proposition is the subject of this 
section. 
A. The Item Veto and Congress 
Congress had good reason to pass the Line Item Veto Act. The 
anti-incumbency sentiment that contributed to the 1994 Republican 
takeover of Congress made it impossible for Congress to ignore 
charges that its fiscal irresponsibility (or as Ross Perot put it 
"waste, fraud, and abuse") jeopardized our nation's economic well-
being. Moreover, with the failure of Gramm-Rudmann and post-
1990 budget summits to check the national debt,97 Congress need-
ed either to rely on traditional mechanisms (increase taxes, reduce 
spending) or fmd a new structural gimmick/approach. Traditional 
mechanisms, however, remained unappealing. Tax increases have 
no political constituency.98 At the same time, Congress could not 
resist constituency-driven appropriations.99 Interest groups and vot-
ers alike expect their representatives to deliver "private goods" in 
exchange for their support.100 In other words, the very reasons 
our national debt has grown so large explain why Congress cannot 
take bold, decisive action to "balance the budget." 
95. See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text. 
96. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text. For an analogous argument, see 
Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agen-
cy lndependem?, 15 CARDOzo L. REV. 272 (1993) (assessing how congressional grants of 
litigating authority to independent agencies affect White House control over independent 
agency operations). 
97. See supra notes 41-59 and accompanying text. 
98. In a recent survey, 75% answered "no" when asked whether "[t]he government 
should raise taxes now as one means of dealing with the federal budget." Who are the 
Democrats?, WASH. POST, July 12, 1992, at A12. 
99. A March 1997 Washington Post Survey underscores this conclusion. In it, 77% of 
respondents opposed reductions in future spending on Social Security and Medicare in 
order to balance the federal budget. See Eric Pianin & Mario Brossard, Americans Oppose 
Cutting Entitlements to Fix Budget, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1997, at A4. 
100. See Glen 0. Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 14 VA. L. 
REV. 403 (1988). Making a similar point in a far more entertaining way, see Dave Barry, 
Backlight, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1997, (Magazine), at W5 (explaining why members of 
Congress interested in reelection cannot cut social security benefits). 
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The Item Veto Act is a sensible response to these pressures. 
Unlike constitutional reform proposals (item veto, balanced budget), 
the Act does not prevent Congress from reasserting its formal 
authority over the size and content of appropriations. Specifically, 
while inconsistent with the constitutional separation of purse and 
sword, the Item Veto Act is, in critical respects, nonbinding. Con-
gress, for example, could nullify the Act's application simply by 
prefacing future appropriations with the clause "Notwithstanding 
any provision of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996."101 With that 
said, unlike expedited recision proposals (that require congressional 
approval of presidential cancellations but compel Congress to ap-
prove or reject proposed cancellations within a specified period of 
time), the Item Veto Act suggests that Congress is willing to 
change the structural division of authority in order to rein in waste-
ful pork barrel spending. 
The Item Veto Act has another advantage. By shifting signifi-
cant cancellation authority to the President, Congress need not 
make two types of hard choices. First, fears of a too powerful 
appropriations committee pruning subcommittee priorities are staved 
off by an inter-branch delegation.102 Second (and far more impor-
tant), Congress need not eliminate constituency-driven programs in 
order to meet deficit reduction targets. Instead, members can still 
support programs that benefit politically powerful interest groups as 
well as their home districts.103 This is absolutely critical. Mem-
bers appear impotent if they cannot deliver private goods legisla-
tion to their sponsors, interest groups and voters. As such, it is 
imperative that members get their constituency-driven programs 
approved by the requisite subcommittees, committees, and the 
Congress.104 By shifting the cancellation decision to the President, 
101. Greg Sidak, in 1995 Senate testimony, made this point, noting that "commitments 
made in bargaining situations influence behavior of other actors only to the extent that the 
person making such commitments is credibly bound (by himself or others) to honoring 
them. A statute and a constitutional amendment differ markedly in their likely efficacy in 
protecting future generations." The Line Item Veto: A Constitutional Approach, Hearing 
before the Constitution Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong, 1st 
Sess. 67 (1995) (statement of J. Gregory Sidak). 
102. On member fears of omnibus appropriations elevating the status of appropriations 
committee leadership, see Neal Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the 
Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE LJ. 389 (1988). 
103. For an explication of the incentives members have to support private goods legisla-
tion, see Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. 
REv. 207 (1984). 
104. See DAVID STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF PoLmcs: HOW THE REAGAN REVOLU-
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members can better accomplish this categorical imperative. In this 
way, members of Congress are made better by asking the President 
to do a certain amount of picking and choosing of budget priori-
ties.1os 
What then of the balance of powers? The Item Veto Act, while 
suggesting that Congress is willing to trade off some of its power 
of the purse when the responsible exercise of that power is too 
costly, 106 is not a wholesale abdication of Congress' power of the 
purse. As noted above, Congress can refuse to give effect to the 
Act by formally waiving any or all of its provisions in subsequent 
enactments. Admittedly, Congress may well be reluctant to take the 
heat for such an obvious repudiation of the Act's laudatory deficit 
reduction objectives. 107 Nonetheless, Congress may limit cancella-
tion authority by following some of the techniques that state law-
makers have used to limit the gubernatorial item veto. 
Let me explain. 108 Unlike state constitutions that include spec-
ifications for the style and format of appropriations bills, Congress 
may decide to appropriate in only large, lump sum amounts, elimi-
nating from the bill specific projects and activities that the Presi-
dent hoped to veto. 109 Furthermore, although presidential cancella-
tion authority extends to items detailed in committee reports, Con-
gress can easily sidestep project-specific cancellations. By identify-
ing program priorities in unofficial and informal documents (a 
statement in the Congressional Record or a note on plain paper), 
Congress can communicate its preferences to agencies. Since agen-
TION FAILED 390-94 (1986) (blaming the failure of the Reagan Revolution on an appropri-
ations process that revolves around subsidies and entitlements). 
105. Thanks to Jerry Mashaw for this insight. Specifically, in a conversation we had 
about the item veto, Mashaw described this process as a lottery whereby members, rather 
than internalize the cost of budget cutting, would take their chances with the President. 
106. Along these lines, when Congress enacted Gramm-Rudman in 1985, it ceded some 
of its appropriations power for precisely this reason. See supra notes 41-48 and accompa-
nying text. 
107. It is also possible that the President will refuse to approve any measure that limits 
Item Veto Act authority. Unless two-thirds of both houses of Congress overrode the veto, 
Congress may have little recourse but to concede presidential cancellation authority. 
108. Some of these examples come from Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully 
Can the States' Item Veto be Transferred to the President, 75 GEO. LJ. 175 (1986). 
Others come from Fisher, supra note 93. 
109. In fact, both Congress and the executive prefer lump sum funding to accommodate 
the need for administrative discretion. Agency officials want the latitude and flexibility 
associated with lump sum funding. Members of Congress also benefit from lump sum 
appropriations because the only way to adjust statutory details to unexpected developments 
is to pass another public law. 
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cies are unlikely to risk retaliation in subsequent legislative cy-
cles, 110 this informal mechanism will detail legislative preferences 
as well as committee report specifications. 
Congress can also bundle a number of disparate projects into a 
single item. Just as the Constitution places no limit on what consti-
tutes a bil1,111 there is no constitutional limitation on what consti-
tutes an item. The Constitution, moreover, contains few limitations 
on the spending power and is silent on the procedures Congress 
was to adopt to authorize and appropriate funds. Today, Congress 
may appropriate by tax, legislative and appropriations committees. 
If Congress chose to do so, it could place substantive legislation in 
appropriations bills and allow authorization committees to fund 
programs directly through the use of "backdoor spending." These 
matters are left exclusively to House and Senate rules, and to 
Congress' interpretation and execution of its rules.112 
Congress' ability to blunt presidential cancellation authority, of 
course, does not mean that Congress will, in fact, limit its delega-
tion of budgetary power. After all, the very reasons why Congress 
had incentive to transfer some of its appropriations power suggest 
that Congress will be reluctant to limit presidential cancellation 
authority. Moreover, by sending a message that the "President 
knows best" when it comes to deficit reduction, Congress must 
guard against the political fallout of end running the Item Veto 
Act. In the end, Congress will only restrict its delegation when it 
has the political will to do battle with the President. Congress' 
power to set budget priorities is therefore contingent on its having 
a sense of stake in either a particular appropriation or its power 
vis-a-vis the President. With that said, as the next section will 
show, battles of this sort will be infrequent, in part, because the 
President may well make limited use of his newly acquired cancel-
lation authority. 
B. The Line Item Veto and the President 
Line Item Veto Act supporters, noting that the President serves 
a diffuse national-as opposed to local or regional-constituency, 
110. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing agency compliance with 
nonstatutory congressional action). 
111. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
112. On the authorization-appropriation distinction, see generally Louis Fisher, The Au-
thorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29 
CATH. U. L. REv. 51 (1979). 
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argue that the item veto enables the President to veto "private 
good" pork, while preserving valuable "public good" features of 
legislation.113 This vision of the President as nonpartisan deficit 
reduction czar misses the mark, however. State experiences with 
the gubernatorial item veto and common sense suggest that the 
President will use cancellation authority to advance his policy 
agenda. Furthermore, discretionary federal spending is not a partic-
ularly rich ore for the President to mine in his efforts to limit 
deficit spending. Mandatory spending, outside the direct control of 
Congress, now accounts fo:r roughly sixty percent of the federal 
budget. Beyond this inherent limitation on cancellation authority, 
the President may well be cautious in asserting item veto authority 
for political advantage. Congressional appropriations are often 
backed by politically potent interests and, as a result, aggressive 
use of the item veto may prove too costly. In other words, while 
the item veto is more about expanding presidential prerogatives 
than reducing the federal deficit, the President may gain little real 
power through this mechanism. 
State experiences with the gubernatorial power to eliminate or 
reduce items in an appropriation have been unquestionably 
mixed.114 Although some evidence supports the notion that the 
item veto can be a significant deficit reduction measure, 115 several 
113. See Robinson, supra note 100; Stephen G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments 
for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 78-81 (1995). For a competing perspec-
tive, see Maxwell L. Steams, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 385 (1992). 
114. The sweep of gubernatorial item veto authority varies from state to state. See THE 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 113-14 (1988-89) (compar-
ing state item veto provisions). In the context of this essay's discussion of state item veto 
experiences, the phrase item veto refers to both gubernatorial item veto authority and 
gubernatorial reduction authority. 
115. The item veto has a reputation for saving money. A 1984 legislative analysis pre-
pared by the American Enterprise Institute concluded that "governors have vetoed or re-
duced appropriations to achieve substantial savings." AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITIITE FOR 
PUBLIC POUCY REsEARCH, PROPOSALS FOR LINE-ITEM VETO AtJTHORITY 17 (1984), re-
printed in Line Item Veto: Hearings on S. 43 Before the Senate Comm. on Rules and 
Administration, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 43]. Specifi-
cally, this study pointed to Governor James Thompson of Illinois, who vetoed $174.7 
million and used his item reduction powers to cut appropriations by an additional $26 
million (about three percent of the appropriations), Governor George Deukmejian of Cali-
fornia, who achieved savings of $1.2 billion (more than four percent of the state budget), 
and Governor Richard Thornburgh of Pennsylvania, who used the item veto to reduce 
spending by $1.15 billion (twelve percent of the budget). /d. at 18. Mark Crain and Jim 
Miller's recent analysis is even more striking. By focusing on states that allow governors 
to reduce items in appropriations, Miller and Crain conclude that an item-reduction veto 
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studies call into question the item veto's effectiveness for reducing 
expenditures.116 Moreover, available evidence suggests that the 
item veto often functions as a partisan political tool that causes 
strife between the executive and legislative branches in state gov-
ernment.117 As Senator Mark Hatfield, Governor of Oregon from 
1958-66, testified in 1984: "Legislators in states which have the 
line-item veto routinely 'pad' their budgets. It is a wonderful way 
for a Democratic-controlled legislature to put a Republican Gover-
nor on the spot: Let him be the one to line-item these issues that 
were either politically popular, or very emotiona1."118 
Studies from Pennsylvania and Michigan support this conclu-
sion.119 The Pennsylvania study suggested that "[w]hen a legisla-
tor, even though opposed in principle to an appropriation, is rea-
sonably certain that the governor will slice it down to more moder-
ate size, he is tempted to bolster himself politically by voting large 
sums of money to a popular cause.'mo The Michigan study 
claimed that the item veto at the state level encouraged legislators 
cuts spending growth in half. See W. Mark Crain & James C. Miller ill, Budget Process 
and Spending Growth, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1021, 1045 (1990)); see also Ray L. 
Brown, The Line Item Veto: How Well Does it Work?, 36 Gov'T Accrs. J. 19 (Winter 
1987-88) (concluding that item reduction veto is an effective deficit reduction tool). 
116. See Glenn Abney & Thomas P. Lauth, The Line-Item Veto in the States: An In-
strument for Fiscal Restraint ·or an lnstrwnent for Partisanship?, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 
372, 374 (1985) (legislatures whose appropriations are subject to item veto are more "fis-
cally irresponsible"); James J. Gosling, Wisconsin Item-Veto Lessons, 46 PUB. ADMIN. 
REv. 292, 298 (1986) (presidential "item veto will likely result in budget reductions," 
though the size of the reduction may not be great); see also Expedited Recision Authority 
for the President, Hearing Before the Legislation and National Security Sub-committee of 
the House Committee on Governmental Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 129-141 
(1993) (statement of Louis Fisher) (challenging veracity of 1992 GAO Report estimate 
that item veto might well reduce the deficit by $70 billion over six years). 
117. A 1988 regression analysis of the item veto and expenditure restraint did not fmd 
"a single instance of a significant negative relationship between item veto powers and 
government spending." David C. Nice, The Item Veto and Expenditure Restraint, 50:2 J. 
POL. 487, 497 (1988). Indeed, according to Nice, "the few significant relationships were 
in the wrong direction." ld. See also Abney & Lauth, supra note 116, at 375 (concluding 
that use of item veto is influenced by political partisanship); Gosling, supra note 116, at 
298 (concluding that Wisconsin experience suggests that the President may use the item 
veto to control a Congress dominated by opposing political party). 
118. Line-Item Veto: Hearings on SJ. Res. 26, SJ. Res. 178, and S. 1921 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 
21 (1984). 
119. See Nelson McGeary, The Governor's Veto in Pennsylvania, 41 AM. POL. SCI. 
REv. 941 (1947); JOHN A. PERKINS, THE ROLE OF TilE GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN IN TilE 
ENACTMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS, MICH. G0VT'L. Snro. No. 11 (1943). 
120. McGeary, supra note 119, at 943. 
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to please their constituents by voting for appropriations far in ex-
cess of anticipated revenues, thus forcing the governor to make the 
inevitable reductions and incur the wrath of the interests adversely 
affected.121 In other words, the availability of an item veto allows 
legislators to shift more of the responsibility for the fiscal process 
to the executive}22 
The Item Veto Act likewise promises to spur on political con-
flict. Like his gubernatorial counterparts, the President will seek 
political advantage through his use of cancellation authority. At the 
least, because the decision of whether a program is subject to 
cancellation lies with the President, programs favored by the Presi-
dent are not subject to cancellation}23 Relatedly, the President 
may demand that members support programs that he favors to 
secure his acquiescence to congressionally approved appropria-
tions.124 In addition to allowing the President to preserve some 
programs that are at least as wasteful as those canceled, ideology 
and partisanship will also defme the exercise of presidential cancel-
121. See PERKINS, supra note 119, at 56 (citing A. MACDONALD, AMERICAN STATE 
GoVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 209-10 (1940)). 
122. Available evidence suggests, moreover, that the item veto is used more frequently 
as a political tool than a fiscal one. The 1986 Rules Committee study determined that the 
item veto "remains first and foremost, a political instrument" See Nice, supra note 117. 
A 1985 survey of budget officers in 45 states likewise concluded that the item veto is 
used more to accomplish political aims than to reduce the budget A 1985 study com-
paring 28 states found that governors of states in which the legislature and governor were 
from opposing parties were more likely to use the item veto. See Abney & Lauth, supra 
note 116. 
Studies of the item veto in selected states likewise support this conclusion. A 1986 
Wisconsin study concluded that states use the item veto primarily as a tool of 
policymaking and partisan politics. See Gosling, supra note 116. A 1985 review of lllinois 
Governor James Thompson's use of the item veto argued that the veto triggered numerous 
political battles. See Sevener, The Amentkltory Veto: To Be or Not To Be So Powerful?, 
11 ILL. IssUES 14 (1985). Finally, a 1984 review by the House Budget Committee deter-
mined that "[t]he power of the line-item veto in states [such as California and Pennsyl-
vania] has given rise to significant political strife which has, at times, threatenect the 
shutdown of Government services and withholding of payments." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. 
ON THE BUDGET, THE LINE-ITEM VETO: AN APPRAISAL, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1984). 
123. Correspondingly, the President is apt to favor programs in states which support 
either him or members of his party at the expense of states that offer little political ad-
vantage to the President and his allies. 
124. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 108 at 189-91 (discussing ways in which the 
President and Congress may horsetrade over favored appropriations). See also Hearings on 
S. 43, supra note 115, at 117 (statement of Milton J. Socolar) (concluding that item veto 
and cancellation proposals "cannot be expected" to reduce the deficit and, therefore, 
"should be viewed in the context of their effect on the relative balance of powers."). 
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lation authority. As such, conflicts between the branches-as the 
states' experiences reveal-are likely to arise.125 
The exercise of cancellation power, however, is not necessarily 
a boon to the presidency. In particular, the President may well find 
himself in a Catch-22. On the one hand, rather than take a political 
beating for failing to reduce the size of the national debt, the Pres-
ident may feel obligated to exercise cancellation authority. On the 
other hand, the exercise of cancellation authority may prove politi-
cally costly. Congress, like state lawmakers, may approve costly 
but politically popular initiatives and thereby invite cancellations 
that might damage the presidency .126 In other words, the Item Ve-
to Act may "actually undermine the President's reputation, his 
ability to resolve conflicts and, ultimately, his political 
strength. "127 
Another (and more probable) outcome is that presidential can-
cellation authority will not matter that much after all. Unlike gov-
ernors who are often bound by balanced budget obligations, the 
President may limit his cancellations to highly visible and political-
ly vulnerable items. For example, when Presidents identify the 
types of items they will cancel, prime candidates are silly sounding 
but not particularly costly items. Accordingly, Presidents may 
"speak loudly but carry a small stick," that is, they may make 
much of the accounts they cancel but may not cancel all that 
much.128 In this way, Presidents do not suffer the costs of cancel-
125. This conflict may well result in substantial delays in the enactment of appropria-
tions bills and uncertainty on the part of agencies, state governments, and private citizens 
regarding their funding levels. 
126. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text; see also FISHER, supra note 93, at 
3-4 (discussing ways in which state lawmakers use the item veto to punish governors); 
The Balanced Budget Amendment-Volume 2, Hearings Before the House Committee on 
the Budget, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992) (Statement of Rep. David Obey) (stating that 
Congress should consider "giv[ing] back the President impoundment authority, lock, stock 
and barrel. I think that would scare the hell out of the White House, because right now 
the White House ... escape[s] all responsibility"). 
127. Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, 
Centralized, Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. 
L. REv. 827, 835 (1996). For this reason, George Bush's highly publicized refusal to 
exercise inherent item veto authority may well have been a by-product of the President's 
fear that he no longer would be able to blame Congress for skyrocketing deficits. See J. 
Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Why Did President Bush Repudiate the "Inherent" 
Line·ltem Veto?, 9 J. L. & POL. 39 (1992). 
128. For example, from 1981-1992, only two domestic programs of significance wcre 
terminated by the White House and Congress. See Lawrence Haas, Never Say Die, 24 
NAT'L J. 755, 756 (March 28, 1992). More strikingly, while President Bush proposed to 
terminate 246 programs in fiscal year 1993, only $5 billion of a $350 billion deficit 
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ing politically popular programs while reaping the benefits of a 
demonstrable commitment to cutting government waste.129 
The likely limits of presidential cancellation authority are best 
revealed in a list that President Reagan submitted to Congress of 
"wasteful, unnecessary, or low priority spending projects" in the 
fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution.130 The continuing resolu-
tion contained $604 billion in budget authority; the Reagan list of 
projects that could have been excised with an item veto contained 
$970 million.131 Moreover, with respect to presidential rescissions, 
the Reagan administration proposed $43.3 billion during its ten-
ure.132 Savings of $970 million in one year or even $43 billion 
over eight years simply do not dent a $150 billion annual deficit. 
Indeed, the President's 1985 Economic Report proclaimed bluntly 
that the item veto "may not have a substantial effect on total Fed-
eral expenditure," but may be used by the President "to change the 
composition of Federal expenditure-from activities preferred by 
the Congress to activities preferred by the President."133 
Preexisting budgetary demands also suggest that presidential 
cancellation authority is more about the balance of powers than 
deficit reduction. Sixty percent of the budget is nondiscretionary 
and therefore is not even covered by annual appropriations. 
Entitlements such as social security and medicare as well as inter-
est on the national debt are handled by permanent appropriations 
would have been reduced through those program cuts. See id. 
129. With respect to the Item Veto Act, this conclusion is buttressed by the fact that 
canceled appropriations cannot be transferred to programs favored by the President. As a 
result, other than make a minuscule impact on a $5.3 trillion (and still rising) national 
debt, the President gains very little by canceling appropriated funds. In contrast, whenever 
the President exercises his cancellation authority he bears the costs of disappointing the 
expectation interests of program beneficiaries as well as some members of Congress. 
130. H.R. Doc. No. 174, tOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988). 
131. See Hearings on SJ. Res. 9, SJ. Res. 23 and SJ. Res. 31, supra note 5 (submit-
ted statement of Louis Fisher of the Congressional Research Service). 
132. See V. MCMURTRY, REsCISSIONS BY TilE PREsiDENT SINCE 1974: BACKGROUND 
AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 10 (Cong. Res. Serv. 1989). 
133. This conclusion applies with equal force to the Bush and Clinton administrations. 
Witness the tug of war between President Bush and Congress over 1992 rescissions. 
While agreeing on the total amount of rescissions, the Congress and White House fought 
a pitched battle over whose preferred programs would be cut. In the end, a compromise 
was reached that merged legislative and executive preferences. See Vivica Novack, Defec-
tive Remedy, 25 Nat'l J. 749 (1993). Along the same lines, President Clinton and the 
Republican Congress fought over the content of fiscal year 1995 rescissions. The President 
preferred Democratic social initiatives; the Congress preferred courthouse and highway pro-
jects. See Andrew Taylor, Spending Powers: Clinton Criticizes Republicans for Line-Item 
Veto Delay, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. RPr. 1627 (1995). 
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and therefore are within the jurisdiction of the tax committees. 
Entitlements, moreover, are controlled by changing substantive law 
(for example, eligibility and level of benefits) rather than through 
the appropriations process. Finally, although technically subject to 
veto or rescission, appropriations that further presidential priorities 
are effectively veto-proof. For example, in light of President 
Reagan's commitment to maintaining defense spending, enhanced 
rescission authority or an item veto in the hands of the Reagan 
administration would have applied at best to less than fifteen per-
cent of the budget. 134 
Presidential cancellation authority offers little hope of fiscal 
salvation. Its impact, if any, will be felt in Congress-White House 
relations. With that said, the ways in which the Item Veto Act will 
affect the dance that takes place between Congress and the Presi-
dent over budget priorities is indeterminate. Will the President use 
this new power to aggressively advance his budget priorities? Will 
presidential cancellation prove little more than symbolic measures 
that neither advance the President's agenda nor reduce the deficit? 
Will Congress force the President to choose between either cancel-
ing politically popular programs or allowing the national debt to 
continue its steady rise? The answer to these and other questions 
will be decided by political will, not structural divisions of authori-
ty. As the next section will detail, the triumph of politics over 
structure is quite typical in the resolution of conflicts between 
Congress and the White House 
C. Political Will and the Balance of Powers 
Formal divisions of authority between the branches, whether an 
outgrowth of statutory delegations or constitutional design, inform 
but do not defme Congress-White House relations.135 Indeed, for-
mal power sharing arrangements play, at best, a marginal role in 
resolving conflicts between Congress and the President. These 
conflicts, instead, are typically resolved through informal negotia-
tion. While formal divisions of authority lurk in the background of 
these disputes, base political concerns often are at the fore of these 
conflicts. For example, the President's exercise of cancellation 
authority is largely dependent on his political popularity, his will-
134. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 108, at 189; Hearings on S. 43, supra note 115, 
at 171. 
135. For an explication of why structural arrangements do not define interbranch rela-
tions, see Fitts, supra note 9. 
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ingness to make deficit reduction a centerpiece. of his policy agen-
da, and whether Congress is controlled by his political party. This 
conclusion hardly qualifies as rocket science. Nevertheless, the 
sugge~tion that presidential cancellation authority is indeterminate is 
reenforced by an examination of other topics that likewise show 
that pressures outside of the constitutional specification of powers 
defme the ways the branches communicate with each other. This 
section will do just that, considering congressional-executive infor-
mation access disputes and the legislative veto.136 
To begin with, Congress and the Executive have strong incen-
tives to work with each other. For Congress, broadly worded stat-
utes that set forth generalized objectives, but are silent on the 
details of administration, are far easier to enact than highly detailed 
legislation that specifies the distribution of benefits and burdens. 
Making use of public choice theory, Harold Bruff has explained 
this phenomenon: "Selecting a decision rule requires a prospec-
tive-and necessarily rough-judgment about which rule will pro-
duce the lowest sum of two kinds of costs: the decision costs of 
obtaining assent from the requisite number of participants and the 
external costs of decisions that disfavor a given participant."137 At 
the same time, while Congress prefers to lower its decision costs 
by delegating power, Congress conditions that delegation on its 
ability to protect its institutional priorities "at the operational stage 
[when] it is much easier to predict the winners and losers from a 
change in the decision rules."138 For this reason, Congress has a 
strong incentive to couch its delegation with mechanisms that en-
able it to "veto" administrative decisions that it disapproves of 
without enacting legislation. Likewise, Congress has strong incen-
136. Another example is War Powers. Specifically, although the Constitution envisions a 
significant legislative role in military policymaking, Presidential priorities tend to dominate 
War Powers decision making. See generally LoUIS FISHER, PREsiDENTIAL WAR POWER 
(1995); Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting Under the UN and NATO, 
47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1237 (1997). The reason for this is that "decisions about such 
matters as troop commitments and the conduct of negotiation are so much more central to 
executive interests than to those of the judiciary or Congress." John 0. McGinnis, Consti-
tutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of 
Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 294 
(1993). In other words, "the interests and capacities of the branches," rather than formal 
divisions of authority, often define which branch of government will exercise authority. /d. 
See also John 0. McGinnis, The Spontaneous Order of War Powers, 41 CASE W. REs. 
L. REV 1317 (1997); Fitts, supra note 9. 
137. Bruff, supra note 103, at 218. 
138. /d. at 221. 
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tives to insist that the Executive share with it information necessary 
to monitor the administration of federal programs. 
The Executive also benefits from these power-sharing arrange-
ments. Witness the White House's participation in the establishment 
and the growth of the legislative veto, a procedure by which de-
partments or agencies would make proposals that would become 
law unless Congress rejected them by a majority vote of either one 
or both house of Congress. Originally proposed by Herbert Hoover 
in 1929, the legislative veto enabled Hoover to "make law" and 
reorganize executive branch operations without subjecting his plan 
to the cumbersome and uncertain lawmaking process.139 Over 
time, the legislative veto grew in popularity but became more 
controversial. Perceiving that CoJ!gress was using this procedure to 
micromanage its operations, the Reagan administration-while 
willing to accept the legislative veto as a condition on its discre-
tion by signing onto statutes containing legislative ve-
toes-successfully challenged the procedure's constitutionality in 
INS v. Chadha.140 
Chadha, rather than suggesting that courts are likely to play a 
large role in resolving disputes between Congress and the White 
House over the line that separates lawmaking from administration, 
spoke to the forces that propel the legislative and executive branch-
es to resolve informally their institutional disputes with one anoth-
er. In the decade after Chadha, 1983-1993, well over two hundred 
legislative vetoes were enacted into law. Although presidential 
signing statements sometimes cite Chadha and proclaim that these 
measures will be treated "as having no legal force or effect,"141 it 
is quite clear that affected agencies comply with legislative veto 
provisions. "Agencies cannot risk . . . collisions with the commit-
tees that authorize their programs and provide funds."142 As Louis 
Fisher observed in his defmitive study of this device, "In one form 
or another, legislative vetoes will remain an important mechanism 
for reconciling legislative and executive interests."143 In fact, Fish-
139. See generally Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW 
& CONIEMP. PROBS. 273 (1993). 
140. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
141. WILLIAM FRENCH SMITII, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION: 
THE MEMOIRS OF AN ATTORNEY GENERAL 221 (1991). 
142. Fisher, supra note 139, at 288. 
143. /d. at 292. 
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er argued, "[n]either Congress nor the executive branch wanted the 
static model of government offered by the Court."144 
Information access disputes tell a nearly identical story. In 
particular, the executive sees little to be gained from fighting emo-
tionally pitched battles over whether information access is neces-
sary for Congress to perform its legislative duties or, alternatively, 
whether information access requests improperly intrude upon the 
executive's duty to administer governmental programs.145 Execu-
tive compliance, however, does not mean that the executive is con-
vinced of the appropriateness of the information access request. 
Instead, Congress' success is often a byproduct of the numerous 
weapons in its arsenal that can be used to punish recalcitrant exec-
utive branch officials. Congress, among other things, may publicly 
embarrass executive branch officials, hold up confnmation hearings 
of presidential nominees, and enact legislation that restricts agency 
operations. 
These congressional powers are potent. For example, executive 
branch officials have no interest in seeing the newspaper headline 
"Congress Subpoenas Documents,"146 nor do they want to be pub-
licly humiliated before an acrimonious legislative hearing. When an 
agency official is called to testify, committee members are put in a 
position of some strength over that individual. If a dispute over 
· information access is going on at the time, the hearing is the 
committee's chance to put a great deal of political and personal 
pressure on the witness. The success of this technique has been 
attested to by committee staffers. The former general counsel to the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Britt Snider, commented 
that "the intelligence agencies withhold such information . . . at 
their own peril. I have found the prospect of being criticized by 
the Committees to be a very compelling motivation for most agen-
cies .... "147 Along the same lines, agencies seem particularly 
willing to work with Congress when the nomination of a high-
144. /d. 
145. For general treatments of this issue, see Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of 
the Presidency, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 17 (1995); Peter M. Shane, Negotiating for Knowl-
edge: Administrative Responses to Congressional Demands for Information, 44 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 197 (1992); Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A 
Modest Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 109 (1996). 
146. Telephone Interview with Linda Gustitus, Staff Director and Chief Counsel, Senate 
Oversight Subcomm. of Government Management (Mar. 25, 1994). 
147. Letter from L. Britt Snider, General Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence to Peter M. Shane (July 10, 1990) (on file with author). 
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ranking agency official is held up, pending executive branch com-
pliance with oversight requests. This is precisely what occurred 
with Clinton's choice for head of the Justice Department's Environ-
ment Section, Lois Schiffer, during Congress' investigation of 
environmental crimes enforcement. 
The question of whether executive branch interests are served 
through such regularized compliance remains. The answer is a 
qualified yes. At the agency and departmental level, it is critically 
important to maintain good relations with legislative overseers. 
Consequently, it is rarely sensible to place abstract principles of 
separation of powers ahead of day-to-day working relationships.148 
As was the case with the legislative veto, Congress needs to dele-
gate in order to reduce the costs of legislation; the Executive needs 
to accept conditions on delegated authority in order to facilitate 
Congress' willingness to transfer power through delegations. "Each 
branch is both a potential ally and adversary of the others, and is 
thus involved in ... a 'bargaining' or 'mixed motive' game in 
which there is a mixture of mutual dependence and conflict, of 
partnership and competition."149 These bargains, rather than for-
mal divisions of authority, defme power sharing among the branch-
es. 
ill. CONCLUSION: SPECULATIONS ON TilE 
BALANCED BUDGEf AMENDMENT 
"[T]he way we design our political institutions reveals much 
about how we wish to resolve our underlying value conflicts in 
society and which goals we embrace over time."150 Without ques-
tion, concerns of Congress' inability to control a deficit run amok 
figured prominently in the Item Veto Act's delegation of cancella-
tion authority to the President. It is equally true, however, that the 
148. Under the current regime, the threshold determination of whether an information 
request raises a "substantial claim of executive privilege" rests with those who have the 
least interest in asserting an executive privilege claim against congressional overseers: the 
department and agency heads. 13 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 185 (1989). While presiden-
tial and Justice Department materials provide guidance as to what types of legislative 
requests are problematic, id., there is little reason to think that agency heads will place 
these values ahead of maintaining good day-to-day relations with their congressional 
overseers. 
149. McGinnis, Constitutional Review, supra note 136, at 299. 
150. Michael Fitts, Ways to Think About the Unitary Executive: A Comment on Ap-
proaches to Government Structure, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 323, 336 (1993); see also 
Lessig, supra note 14. 
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Item Veto Act is a bit of an empty shell, the contents of which 
will be filled through political gamesmanship. Although specifying 
that presidential cancellations reduce the federal budget deficit 
without harming the national interest, 151 the Act neither requires 
presidential action nor limits legislative-executive horsetrading that 
may increase the national debt.152 That is, if Congress is truly 
committed to either reducing deficits or (heaven forbid) balancing 
the budget, it needs to do more than authorize presidential cancel-
lations. 
On this score, the failure of Congress and the President to rally 
behind the Balanced Budget Amendment is revealing.153 While 
filled with loopholes, 154 the Balanced Budget Amendment is con-
sequential in ways that the Item Veto Act is not. Most strikingly, 
"[t]he President would be duty bound to impound funds ... and 
perhaps obligated to defend those programs of which he disap-
proves."155 
The President, for good reason, sees little political advantage in 
this potentially massive transfer of power. Unlike the Item Veto 
Act, where the President can both increase debt through 
horsetrading and limit his cancellations to programs which lack a 
meaningful political base, an enforceable Balanced Budget Amend-
ment may well force the President to upset settled expectations by 
defunding entitlements and the like.156 Rather than commit politi-
151. This specification may well satisfy the constitutional standard governing legislative 
delegations of policymaking, that is, an "intelligible principle" that sets decipherable 
boundaries. This standard is set forth in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. 
Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). For 
this reason, I think the disnict court's invocation of Chadha to strike down the Line Item 
Veto Act was misplaced. See supra note 8. 
152. For example, nothing in the Act prevents the President from conditioning his ap-
proval of an item on Congress' funding one of his pet projects. 
153. See Eric Pianin & Helen Dewar, Budget Amendment Barely Loses in Senate, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1997, at AI. 
154. See The Balanced Budget Amendment, Hearings Before the House Committee on 
the Budget, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 189-197 (1992) (statement by Louis Fisher) [hereinafter 
102d Congress Hearings); see also Devins, supra note 17, at 75-82 (discussing ways in 
which lawmakers can skirt the amendment's deficit reduction goals). 
155. Balanced Budget Amendment, Hearings Concerning HJ. Res. I before the House 
Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1997) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein); see 
also 1994 Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing at 82 (statement of Charles Fried) 
(stating that the President could "argue with considerable plausibility" that he has a "duty" 
to impound). Not surprisingly, governors are more prone to use their item veto authority 
in states with balanced budget amendments. See 102d Congress Hearings, supra note 154 
(statement of Louis Fisher). 
156. Whether Congress would craft an enforceable Balanced Budget Amendment, of 
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cal suicide on a regular basis, the President would much prefer to 
embrace optimistic economic forecasts ~d put off hard budgetary 
choices until after the next election.157 
The Congress too has good reason to steer clear of a meaning-
ful balanced budget amendment. 158 This fundamental change in 
the structure of government, while imposing significant political 
costs on the President, does not allow Congress to protect its inter-
ests through horsetrading and other techniques. That the amendment 
scores well with focus group participants is inadequate compensa-
tion for this wholesale transfer of budgetary power. 159 Put another 
way, there is little political gain in compulsory presidential im-
poundments of congressionally favored programs. 
Absent fundamental change affecting either the way we elect 
public officials or their terms of office, it is unlikely that elected 
officials will impose the costs of a balanced budget (through severe 
program cuts or substantial tax increases) on the present genera-
tion.160 Elected officials have little incentive to balance the bud-
get. Hearings are filled with witnesses who benefit from congres-
sional spending. Since the costs of spending are typically spread 
throughout the nation, few witnesses oppose spending. A 1990 
study by James Payne found a 145 to 1 ratio of witnesses support-
ing proposed spending.161 While the incentives for spending are 
strong, there is no incentive to fmance increased spending through 
tax hikes. Elected officials (who want to stay elected), therefore, 
"'enjoy' appropriating money to benefit their constituents, but they 
do not 'enjoy' taxing them."162 Former chair of the House Budget 
course, is another matter altogether. 
157. See Clay Chandler & Eric Pianin, A Strategy to Delay the Pain, WASH. POST, Feb. 
7, 1997, at AI; Clay Chandler and Eric Pianin, President Won't Back CPI Panel, WASH. 
PoST., March 13, 1997, at Al. For this reason, as Mike Fitts sagely observed: "[T]he 
individuality, centrality, and visibility of the "personal unitary president," which is seen as 
an advantage in terms of collective choice and public debate, can be a disadvantage when 
it comes to conflict resolution and public assessment." Fitts, supra note 127, at 835. 
158. Congress, however may pursue a Balanced Budget Amendment with gimmicks and 
loopholes. Such action would enable Congress to duck responsibility while appearing to 
act decisively. It also would reenforce the trend of Congress' divesting itself of some 
formal power in the name of reducing annual deficits. 
159. See Editorial, Constitutional Boondoggle, WAU.. ST. J., Feb. 4, 1997, at AI8. 
160. Don Elliot endorses the convening of a Constitutional Convention to examine such 
far reaching reform. See E. Donald Elliot, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 
1985 DUKE L. J. 1077, 1096-1110 (1985). 
161. See James L. Payne, The Congressional Brainwashing Machine, 1990 PUBUC IN-
TEREST 4 (1990). When this finding was reported to congressional staffers, their reaction 
was surprise that the gap was not larger. See id. 
162. Elliot, supra note 160, at 1091 (citing JAMES BUCHANAN & ROBERT WAGNER, 
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Committee James R. Jones (D-Okla.) summed it up this way: 
"There is a constituency for national defense. There is a constituen-
cy for every item of the domestic budget. There is a loud constitu-
ency for tax cuts. But there really is no constituency for a bal-
anced budget."163 That future generations will bear the brunt of 
this imbalance is a pill that most politicians are willing to swal-
low.164 
Unless and until elected government is willing to risk signifi-
cant political capital in the name of intergenerational equity, super-
ficial reform measures-like Gramm-Rudman and the Item Veto 
Act-will continue to rule the day. These initiatives, as this essay 
has shown, offer little hope of tackling the national debt. Rather, 
these measures do little more than shield political actors from 
facing up to the consequences of their budgetary policy.165 
Proposals to mandate a balanced budget assume that the habits 
and incentives of elected government will change. While some 
change is possible, the cataclysmic change necessary to balance the 
budget seems a pipe dream. Witness the Line Item Veto Act. 
While far from inconsequential, the Act will not result in deficit 
savings and will only marginally affect the balance of powers. 
Congress and the White House, moreover, continue to oppose a 
meaningful Balanced Budget Amendment because of the pain it 
will inflict to politically potent constituencies.166 Finally, tax in-
creases and significant entitlement cuts remain taboo. None of this 
is to suggest that government is uninterested in operating efficiently 
or eliminating costly, ineffective programs. It is to suggest, howev-
er, that (nearly fifteen years after Gramm-Rudman) fundamental 
budget reform is an idea whose time is yet to come. All of this, of 
course, may change · in the not too distant. future.167 With that 
DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: POLmCAL LEGACY OF LoRD KEYNES 93-94 (1977)). 
163. Richard Snelling, The Deficit's Clear and Present Danger, N.Y. nMES, Mar. 3, 
1985, (Magazine), at 48, 70. 
164. See Elliot, supra note 160, at 1091-92 (discussing the works of public choice 
theorists James Buchanan and Richard Wagner). 
165. On this point, see Lessig, supra note 14; ROBERT BORK, EPILOGUE - THE DECLINE 
OF PREsiDENTIAL POWER 58 ON PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES (1988) ("[T)he political 
and constitutional questions surrounding" the item veto makes clear that this proposal 
"treat[s) symptoms rather than to cure causes."). Whether the national debt is a problem 
that merits such fundamental change is another question altogether. With that said, the 
hypocrisy of budget reform is highly problematic, for it dilutes the responsibility of gov-
ernment. 
166. An item veto constitutional amendment would not present this problem. 
167. For example, if the national debt continues its stratospheric rise, public pressure to 
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said. especially after the reelection of Bill Clinton. there is reason 
to think that the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress is not the 
"constitutional moment.. that some thought it might be.168 The 
more things change. the more they stay the same. 
"balance the budget" may eventually propel fundamental constitutional change. 
168. For a speculative argument that the 1994 election might constitute such a "mo-
ment," see Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 
845 (1996). 
